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STEVEN PINKER CLAIMS in The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) that
nearly all social-scientific evidence tells us violence is declining. This paper
makes no claims against Pinker’s main argument; criticisms of it having been
addressed elsewhere (Pinker 2015). However, one secondary hypothesis
Pinker puts forward is that the development of strong states was a key factor
in the decline of violence (2011, 42). Summarizing his reading of the
evidence, Pinker writes, “[t]he reduction of homicide by government control
is so obvious to anthropologists that they seldom document it with
numbers… It goes without saying that people that have been brought under
the jurisdiction of a government will not fight as much, so they are simply
excluded from studies in indigenous societies” (2011, 55–56). While Pinker
cites one survey of traditional societies that finds that before World War I
such societies were frequently more violent,1 he otherwise deems the
connection between the rise of states and the decline of violence obvious and
uncontroversial.
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1 According to the authors of the survey, this measure of violence is meant to proxy
for “the influence of colonialism, inclusion of the society in world market economy, and
other forces that should directly affect the ability of kin groups to act as vengeanceseeking units” (Ericksen and Horton 1992, 71).
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Pinker’s hypothesis that the development of strong states played an
important role in reducing violence can be addressed using the same types of
simple empirical tests found elsewhere in his book. The closest such test
Pinker provides is reproduced as Figure 1, where he shows, drawing from a
variety of sources, that even the most peaceful indigenous (nonstate) societies
had homicide rates as high as the ten largest American cities in 1990 (which
were much higher than they have been recently).

Figure 1: Homicide rates in the least violent nonstate societies compared to state societies.

On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the market is as
effective as or more effective than states at providing public goods such as
criminal justice (e.g., Peden 1977; Friedman 1979; Leeson 2007). Elsewhere
in his book, Pinker provides myriad scatterplots and trend lines to further his
arguments.2 The purpose of this paper is to surpass the quality of the
comparison Pinker makes between state and nonstate societies to bring the
quality to that of the other comparisons of his book. I run a series of simple
regressions using measures of degrees of government as the explanatory
variable to explain country-level homicide rates in developing countries. I
then modestly improve on the quality of the empirical test by including
certain control variables. While these parsimonious specifications are weak
tests of causality, they are strictly better tools than trend lines or scatterplots.3

To be fair, while doing so he also cites other scholars who perform more
sophisticated analyses.
3 Pinker’s primary hypothesis relates the passing of time with declines in violence.
The empirical evidence that takes the form described above is similar to Figure 1 (though
2
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To perform this analysis, I use the World Bank Development
Indicators’ international homicides (per 100,000 people) data for lowerincome countries (from 2012, 2011, or 2010, using the most recent available).
I use these data because homicide rates in less developed countries reflect the
factors led to elevated homicide rates in the now-developed world prior to
the period when rates declined. If a single variable—the rise of the state—
contributed to the decline in violence as much as Pinker argues, such a
relationship should also be present to at least some extent cross-sectionally in
developing countries in the modern world. Although the modern world in
less developed countries differs greatly from, for example, Europe two
centuries ago, this approach allows for the execution of simple econometric
methods that are suggestive, if imperfect.4
While the data quality on homicide rates often raises suspicions, this
type of data comprises the backbone of the empirics found in Pinker’s book.
Furthermore, identifying relationships between institutions and international
homicide rates is certainly possible in general (see, e.g., Stringham and
Levendis 2010, Bjornskov 2015). I use three measures of the strength of
government: Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank, Polity
IV from the Center for Systemic Peace, and government consumption as a
percentage of GDP from World Development Indicators. Worldwide
Governance Indicators (an average of which I used to create a single
measure) can be interpreted as government effectiveness, state capacity (i.e.,
the ability of a state to marshal resources and perform tasks should it choose
to do so), or the quality of bureaucracy (see, e.g., Fukuyama 2014). The Polity
IV index measures the strength of democratic institutions across countries.
Therefore, regardless of whether we conceive of the state in terms of its raw
size, its ability to perform various functions, or its modern, democratic
character, the empirical tests here capture the relevant facts.
As a control variable, I use gross nominal income (most recent
available) from World Development Indicators. I also use the Gini
coefficient, a measure of inequality, from the most recently available year as

less rudimentary) as well as, in Pinker (2011), figures 2-2, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-7, 3-10, 312, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3-18, 3-19, and others. Taking this evidence together, I do not
object to Pinker’s conclusion. However, regarding the relationship between violence and
the presence of the state, this paper finds Pinker’s argument to lack similar empirical
support.
4 This approach is consistent with Pinker’s and others’ use of anthropological
scholarship on present-day societies to study societies in the distant past. This usage is
what Figure 1, for example, implies.
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found in the World Income Inequality Database (UNU-WIDER 2015). Table
1 provides descriptive statistics for each of the control variables as well as for
the variables of interest.5 Studies frequently find the Gini coefficient to have a
positive statistical relationship with the homicide rate (as in Stringham and
Levandis 2010), while gross national income (GNI) is a measure of economic
development that covers an extensive number of lower-income countries.
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Variable

n

mean

stdev

min

max

Homicides

79

10.366

12.333

0.6

90.4

Polity

71

3.113

5.214

-9

10

World Governance
Indicators

70

0.320

0.107

0.083

0.61

Government consum.
as a % of GDP

70

15.002

10.373

2.8

85.75

Log gross nominal
income

79

3.134

0.340

2.415

3.603

Gini coefficient

72

41.099

8.107

26.4

64.3

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

These control variables, in addition to regional dummies6 (variables
which account for characteristics specific to parts of the world) are the only
controls in this paper. Other analyses using homicide rates sometimes have
more controls, but the point in this argument is that methods that are as
strong as or stronger than those Pinker employs do not support the
secondary hypothesis I consider here.
Table 2 provides baseline results for both lower-income and lowermiddle-income countries. Each regression employs robust standard errors. I
place each variable measuring the strength of government (Polity IV,
Worldwide Governance Indicators, and government consumption as a
percentage of GDP) in a simple regression explaining homicide rates.
Following each simple regression, I also add gross nominal income, the Gini
coefficient, and the regional dummies. To reiterate, the point of these

In this table, the homicide rate is the variable with the largest sample, even though
it covers the fewest number of countries. This is because, since I knew in advance that it
would be the binding constraint, I first compiled it and then matched the other data to it.
6 The regional dummies correspond to Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the
Arab world; Oceania is omitted.
5
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regressions is not to establish a deeply satisfying identification strategy but to
provide a very basic test of the argument that the strength of governments is
what drives the fall in violence in the countries that have not yet approached
the stability and wealth of the developed world.7 I then replicate these
specifications in Table 2 but omit lower-middle-income countries so as to
focus only on the poorest countries.
TABLE 2. Strength of Governments and Homicide Rates—Lower- and Lower-Middle-Income
Countries
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Polity IV

0.197
(0.286)

-0.135
(0.217)

World Governance
Indicators
Government consum.
as % of GDP

1.800
(12.574)

-10.700
(10.650)
0.024
(0.127)

0.134
(0.125)

Logged gross nominal
income

4.405
(4.497)

4.996
(3.920)

-0.092
(4.930)

Gini coefficient

0.380*
(0.225)

0.452*
(0.258)

0.465*
(0.248)

Constant

10.357*** -22.841
(1.310)
(14.263)

10.218**
(4.483)

-28.523
(17.727)

10.504*** -21.850
(2.148)
(13.177)

Regional dummies?

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

0.006

0.365

0.000

0.378

0.000

0.417

71

68

70

68

70

68

𝑅

2

n

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------* denotes 10% confidence. ** denotes 5% confidence. *** denotes 1% confidence. Robust standard
errors were employed and are provided parenthetically.

When I perform these tests, under no specification does the strength of
government statistically significantly predict homicide rates. The point
estimates of the relationship vary widely, giving us weak grounds for
interpreting them at all. In some sense, these tests fail to reject the null
hypothesis in very favorable circumstances: regressions 1, 3, and 5 are

Although identification is not the purpose of these exercises, it is worth noting that
including an omitted variable that would show that governments reduce violence would
be a bit counterintuitive. Variables correlated with stronger governments as defined here
tend to be related to positive outcomes and prosperity (protection of property rights,
education, etc.). If the reason why strong government is not related to less violence is that
less violence is endogenous to such an omitted variable, it would imply that that omitted
variable is causing more violence.
7
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univariate regressions with seventy or more observations. In the absence of
any other competing hypothesis (besides the null), these regressions, which
allow the strength of the state to claim whatever portion of declines in
homicide rates it is correlated with, do not support Pinker’s claim.
TABLE 3. Strength of Governments and Homicide Rates—Lower-Income Countries Only
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Variable
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
Polity IV

-0.292
(0.236)

-0.413
(0.265)

World Governance
Indicators

-0.206
(14.636)

-11.539
(17.342)

Government consum.
as % of GDP

0.028
(0.145)

-0.141
(0.176)

Logged gross nominal
income

-1.248
(7.423)

-0.957
(8.407)

-1.308
(6.646)

Gini coefficient

0.174
(0.118)

0.183
(0.203)

0.120
(0.126)

Constant

9.579***
(1.104)

2.294
(16.729)

8.914**
(4.600)

3.723
(25.862)

8.492***
(2.130)

6.390
(17.168)

Regional dummies?

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

𝑅2

0.048

0.315

0.000

0.281

0.001

0.244

n

30

29

29

29

29

28

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------* denotes 10% confidence. ** denotes 5% confidence. *** denotes 1% confidence. Robust standard
errors were employed and provided parenthetically.

While these tests are not robust econometrically and offer little
evidence of causation, they are at least as rigorous as the graphs and time
series Pinker marshals throughout his book. The central claim of his work—
that violence has declined—can be demonstrated persuasively using the data
Pinker provides: if one does not impugn the data sources themselves,
obtaining this result is almost a matter of arithmetic. But the circumstantial
evidence and narrative Pinker employs provide much less support for his
secondary hypotheses, such as the causal reasons for the decline in violence.
Numerous books have provided explanations as to why the modern
world has developed the institutions that allow nations to become richer,
safer, and more educated (e.g., Diamond 1997; Fukuyama 2014; Acemoglu
and Robinson 2012). The Better Angels of Our Nature succeeds in giving us
reason to believe its central thesis. But this note provides some baseline
evidence suggesting that when Pinker partakes in similar narrative
explanations—for example, by crediting a strong state for the decline in
violence—his argument may not withstand scrutiny.
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